

We must decide we will not tolerate more tragedies like that mother's. When we do that, together, we can replace our children's fear with hope.

Thanks for listening.

NOTE: The address was recorded at 5:20 p.m. on April 15 in the Cabinet Room at the White House for broadcast at 10:06 a.m. on April 16.

Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters in Newport News, Virginia

April 17, 1994

The President. Ladies and gentlemen, I've received a number of reports today on the situation in Bosnia. I've also been in touch today with President Yeltsin.

We don't have any definitive reports on the status of Gorazde, but I can tell you that there has been some progress in the negotiations between the United Nations and the Serbs. Mr. Akashi has been working on it, Ambassador Redman and Mr. Churkin, and they may have something to announce shortly.

I also—I don't know that this has been made public or not, but the Serbs released 16 Canadian soldiers, and we're working on the release of the other UNPROFOR forces today. So the situation is still tense around Gorazde. There is still some degree of uncertainty there, but there has been, as of my latest report, which was just about 10 minutes ago, some progress in the negotiations between the U.N. and the Serbs on getting back to the negotiations and reducing the tensions.

Q. What's the U.S. role been?

The President. Well, essentially, we've been—Ambassador Redman has been there. He's been working very hard, especially for the last 7 hours, trying to hammer out an agreement that everybody could live with, along with the U.N. and Mr. Churkin.

Secondly, we've worked very closely with the Russians trying to think about what the end game might be, how we can work this out to a successful conclusion over the long run. And of course, we're still a very important part of the NATO alliance, and we're committed to doing whatever we're asked to

do by General Rose. But keep in mind, except for the safe area around Sarajevo, our role in NATO has been to provide close air support, or, if necessary, to protect the UNPROFOR troops, the U.N. troops, and where it's possible to do that. So we have the role, but we also have this diplomatic role, and we're doing our best to fulfill it.

Q. Have there been any violations of the new truce since the 3-mile zone was agreed to?

The President. I don't want to comment on anything definitively with regard to Gorazde, because we have been getting reports over the last 4 and 5 hours, kind of mixed reports. But on balance, the last report I got was encouraging in terms of an agreement impending between the U.N. and the Serbs.

Q. Were the next reports reports of tank incursions into that zone?

The President. There's one, I think. I think there was a news report that there was at least one tank sighted. But I want to say that we have no reports at the moment that the status of Gorazde has changed.

Thank you.

Q. Is military action still possible?

The President. It depends on NATO. It depends on what the U.N. commander on the ground, General Rose wants. But their conclusions were twofold. One is that with regard to Gorazde itself, it wouldn't necessarily be possible now for close air support to have the desired military effect. And secondly, that they're trying to get a negotiated agreement here that can serve as the basis not only for relieving Gorazde but for getting these peace talks back on track. So that's what we hope we're doing.

Q. Are you considering actually easing the economic sanctions on the Serbs?

The President. No, not based on anything that's happened so far. We have said to the Russians that if they want to discuss that with us, that of course we would be willing to discuss it if certain conditions on the ground were met. But continued Serb aggression on the ground, not only in Gorazde but everywhere else, is hardly an encouragement to discuss that. That's not even—we can't even begin discussions in the environment which has existed for the last few days there.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:25 a.m. at the Newport News Williamsburg International Airport. In his remarks, he referred to Yasushi Akashi, highest ranking U.N. official in the Former Yugoslavia; Ambassador Charles E. Redman, U.S. Special Envoy for the Former Yugoslavia; and Vitaly Churkin, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister. A tape was not available for verification of the content of these remarks.

Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange With Reporters Prior to Departure for Milwaukee, Wisconsin

April 18, 1994

The President. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to say a word or two about the situation in Bosnia. First of all, as all of you know, the situation in and around Gorazde remains grim and uncertain. I think it is important to point out why this happened. It happened because the Serbs violated the understandings of a cease-fire that they—agreement they made with both the United Nations and with the Russians. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the Russians, working through Mr. Churkin's able leadership, have reached an agreement with the Serbs which they have not honored.

The United Nations commander on the ground, General Rose, made the judgment at several points over the last couple of days that NATO close-air support was either not practically feasible or would not be helpful under the circumstances. In Gorazde, we have—we, the United States working through NATO—basically are empowered only to provide close-air support to U.N. troops when they are under siege or under threat of attack on request of the U.N. commander.

I have monitored this situation very closely all weekend; I have spent a good deal of time on it on Saturday. I had lots of conversations yesterday about it and have met this morning with Mr. Lake. Our national security principals will be meeting today to consider what else we can and should do in this circumstance.

The main thing I want to point out is that we have to find a way to get the momentum back. The big successes in the last couple

of months in Bosnia have been, obviously, preserving Sarajevo and achieving the agreement between the Croatians and the Government—the Bosnian Government. They are very important; those things still hold, and I'm convinced we can find a way to build on them and go forward.

But this has not been a great weekend for the peace effort in Bosnia. I do think that the big things are still working in the long-term favor of peace. And we'll just have to see where we are, and we'll be reporting more as the day goes on and through the rest of the week.

Q. Mr. President, you wanted to lift the arms embargo a year ago, would you still like to do it? You would lead an effort to do that? It would take American leadership, many in Congress say, to do this.

The President. The Americans tried to lead it before. We will be discussing now what our other options are. As you know, at the time there was a clear specific reason we couldn't succeed in lifting the arms embargo, which was that not just the Russians but the French and British did not want to do it because they had soldiers on the ground. Now their soldiers on the ground are in danger. The real question we would have to work through there is how many countries would go along, and could we get it through the U.N.? But I've always favored doing it.

I just want to say, though—I want to ask you all to think about—those who say, there are many who say, "Well, we can do it unilaterally, and we ought to do it unilaterally." But remember, if we do that, first of all, there are substantial questions about whether under international law we can do it, but secondly, if you resolved all those—what about the embargo that we have led against Iraq that others would like to back off of but they don't because they gave their agreement that they wouldn't? What if we needed embargoes in the future? What about the trade sanctions on Serbia themselves? What about any possible future economic action in other countries where we have difficulties today that we'd want other countries to honor?

So we have to think long and hard about whether we can do this unilaterally. But certainly, as you know, I have always thought that the arms embargo operated in an en-